ABSTRACT Magnetic secure transmission (MST) is a technology that emulates the action of swiping a magstripe card in a card reader in that it artificially generates the magnetic signal produced when a card is swiped. MST provides extremely high backward compatibility, i.e., mobile payment using an MST device is possible through most conventional magstripe readers. However, MST devices transmit magnetic signals to a remote magstripe card reader. Hence, it is possible to eavesdrop on such signals. We developed a device that can remotely eavesdrop on magnetic signals emitted by MST devices. Thus, we could obtain the one-time payment token contained in such signals at a maximum distance of 2.7 m. We successfully performed a wormhole attack against Samsung Pay, a widely used MST-based mobile payment service, and we were able to execute payment a few kilometers from where the eavesdropped one-time token was actually created.
I. INTRODUCTION
Magnetic secure transmission (MST) is a technology used in devices such as smartphones that emit magnetic signals that mimic magnetic stripes on traditional payment cards. The magnetic signals emitted by the device are sent to the payment terminal's card reader. Thus, MST emulates swiping of a physical card without the need to upgrade the terminal's software or hardware. Using this technology, we can encode payment information in the magnetic signals generated by the MST device, which is similar to embedding such information in a magstripe card.
MST is particularly useful when applied to mobile payment systems. For example, if a smartphone is equipped with MST, credit card information is provided to such an MST device through the user interface, and the user can use the MST device for payment by generating magnetic signals containing the credit card information. Thus, payments can be made without credit cards.
MST technology was developed and patented by LoopPay [1] , which was acquired by Samsung Electronics. Therefore, the patents related to MST now belong to Samsung Electronics [2] . MST is currently used in Samsung Pay, a global mobile payment service launched by Samsung Electronics [3] .
In this paper, we investigate the possibility of eavesdropping on magnetic signals generated by MST devices. Magnetic signals generated by an MST device are transmitted to a magstripe card reader in a contactless manner. Hence, it is possible to eavesdrop on such signals. However, according to LoopPay, it is extremely difficult to conduct such eavesdropping because MST devices can transmit signals only through a very small range (1 to 4 inches) [4] .
To investigate the possibility of such eavesdropping, we try to receive the magnetic signals generated by an MST device remotely and verify whether the received information can be correctly decoded and extracted. Toward this end, we develop a receiver for the magnetic signals and connect it to a smartphone. Then, we attempt to receive the magnetic signals generated by the MST device. We implement software modules to process the magnetic signals transmitted from the receiver to the smartphone in order to decode and extract the information encoded in the magnetic signals. Furthermore, we verify the correctness of the decoded information by manually comparing the extracted data with the original data from the MST device.
The results of our experiments show that the proposed eavesdropper can extract encoded payment information correctly from the received magnetic signals generated by the MST device at a distance of up to 2.7 m.
We perform a wormhole attack against Samsung Pay, a widely used MST-based mobile payment service, to verify that eavesdropping of MST magnetic signals is a real security threat. Samsung Pay requires an MST device to send one-time token information to a magstripe card reader for payment. Thus, in the wormhole attack, while the Samsung Pay app is being used to execute payment via MST, we eavesdrop on the one-time token being emitted by the MST device and send it to the remote attack helper through the Internet. The helper then uses the token for payment.
By performing the attack in a real environment, we were able to successfully execute payment. This constitutes clear evidence that eavesdropping of MST magnetic signals is a real security threat.
Compared with the conference version [5] , this paper differs in the following aspects.
• An extensive study is conducted to increase the range of eavesdropping. Thus, the range is increased by around 28% compared to the conference version.
• We implement a jammer to facilitate attacks on the Samsung Pay protocol. Using this jammer, the attacker can block the victim's payment while remotely eavesdropping on the one-time token being used. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces MST and Samsung Pay. Section III explains the implementation of the proposed eavesdropping system. Section IV describes experiments conducted to eavesdrop on MST signals using the proposed system under various environments and eavesdropping distances. Section V introduces the wormhole attack targeting the Samsung Pay protocol. Section VI discusses various topics to improve the success rate of the attack against the Samsung Pay protocol. Section VII reviews related studies. Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce MST and Samsung Pay to enable readers to better understand this study.
A. MAGNETIC SECURE TRANSMISSION (MST)
Let us consider a conventional off-line payment scenario using a magstripe credit card. When a credit card is swiped in a card reader, a magnetic signal is generated, and the card reader can recognize the payment information in the card by decoding the information in the magnetic signal. The MST device remotely generates such a magnetic signal and transmits it to the card reader, which then recognizes the signal. Fig. 1 compares conventional magstripe card swiping and MST. To understand the key aspects of this study, it is necessary to understand how the transmitted magnetic signals are converted into payment information. An overview of the process is shown in Fig. 2 . The details of this process are provided in this subsection. This is the same process by which a conventional magnetic card reader receives and converts the obtained magnetic signal into payment information. 
1) CONVERTING THE MAGNETIC SIGNAL INTO AN ELECTRONIC SIGNAL
First, the card reader converts the received magnetic signal into an electronic signal so that the other components can decode the information in the card reader. If a magnetic card is swiped as shown in Fig. 3-(A) , a magnetic signal is generated in the ''Gap in Iron core'' shown in Fig. 3-(C) . The magnetic signal is converted into an electrical signal by the ''Electric Wire'' and transmitted to the other components in the card reader. In MST, the magnetic signal is directly emitted to the ''Electric Wire'' part. Fig. 3 -(D) describes the situation that occurs when the magnetic stripe is swiped in a magnetic card reader. 
2) DEMODULATING THE ELECTRONIC SIGNAL INTO BITS
The electrical signal obtained in the previous step is converted into bit values of 0 and 1, which will be later translated into meaningful payment information. To understand this conversion process, let us consider how bit values are expressed in a magstripe card. As shown in the upper part of Fig. 3-(B) , the magnetic stripe in a card can be regarded as connecting a number of magnets, and there are only two types of magnets: short and long. If such a card is swiped in the card reader, a magnetic signal is created as shown in the lower part of Fig. 3-(B) . The shape of the magnetic signal is dependent on the lengths of the magnets. As shown in the lower part in Fig. 3-(B) , the signal chunk generated by swiping a long magnet represents bit 0, and the signal chunk generated by swiping two short magnets continuously represents bit 1. As explained in the previous step, the magnetic signals are converted into electrical signals on the basis of Faraday's law, but the characteristics of the signals are maintained. Accordingly, it is possible to extract the bit values contained in the signal.
3) DECODING THE BITS INTO PAYMENT INFORMATION
This step describes how payment information, such as credit card information, is decoded using the bit values extracted in the previous step. Fig. 4 provides a reference for converting bit strings into characters. The transmitted bit stream is divided and processed in units of 5 bits, and the fifth bit in every unit is a parity bit. Each 5-bit value corresponds to one character. The ''Function'' column in Fig. 4 indicates whether each bit string constitutes actual payment information or whether it is used for bit stream management.
Finally, the converted individual characters are mapped to different payment information according to their locations using Fig. 5 . For example, after the first start sentinel (character ''B'') is identified, the characters until the next field separator (character ''D'') are recognized as the primary account number. Thus, items of payment information can be extracted until the end sentinel appears, and the correctness of the entire translation result can be checked using LRC characters after the end sentinel. 
B. SAMSUNG PAY
Samsung Pay [7] was launched in the US on Sep. 28, 2015. The two major credit card companies (MasterCard and Visa) support Samsung Pay, as do most major US mobile service providers (Sprint, AT&T, Verizon, and US Cellular) [8] . In addition, major banks, including American Express, Bank of America, and Citibank, provide payment services that are compatible with Samsung Pay. More than 1 million users have paid for items using Samsung Pay, with around 0.1 million users using the app every day [9] . On average, US$1.8 million per day is spent using Samsung Pay. Worldwide, around 34 million people use Samsung Pay [10] . As of Apr. 2018, Samsung Pay is available in 23 countries worldwide, including South Korea, US, China, Russia, Canada, UK, India, Brazil, Australia, Spain, and Italy [11] . Fig. 6 outlines the payment protocol used by the Samsung Pay app. Before payment starts, credit card registration is performed. According to the authors in [12] , the registration step uses the standard EMV protocol [13] . Fig. 6 shows the payment procedure of Samsung Pay, which we determined on the basis of our experiments. In Step 0 of Fig. 6 , the user is authenticated on his/her device on the basis of his/her fingerprint or PIN. Next, FIDO authentication is performed in Step 1. After data exchange between the server (maintained by the Samsung Pay system) and the user device to check the validity of the user's credentials, the user's device acquires a one-time token for the current transaction. During Step 1, the one-time token information that is used to verify the validity of the current payment transaction is sent from a Samsung Pay server to a server controlled by the credit card company, as shown in the veiled section in Fig. 6 . We found that the one-time token cannot be used after a certain amount of time has elapsed since Step 1 is completed. Thus, we were able to deduce that Step 1 and the veiled step are run simultaneously. Using MST, the user is then able to make a payment at a POS machine as though swiping a credit card through the machine's magstripe reader. The payment information is sent to the credit card company's server through a value-added network (VAN). After some verification, such as checking the amount of time elapsed since the token was issued, the company either accepts or rejects the payment transaction. The result is then sent back to the POS machine through the VAN. This paper deals with the vulnerability of the Samsung Pay protocol related to the magnetic field signal containing payment information. In this regard, the protocol parameters that we can consider are the baseband frequency of the transmitted magnetic field signal, the number of magnetic field signal emissions per a payment attempt, the magnetic field signal emission interval, and the validity period of the one-time token used for one payment. Details of each variable are discussed in Appendix.
1) SAMSUNG PAY PAYMENT PROTOCOL

2) SECURITY FEATURES OF SAMSUNG PAY
Samsung Pay has many security features, such as tokenization, a hardware security platform, and FIDO authentication [12] - [15] , which are briefly introduced in this section. Tokenization refers to the generation of a one-time token for each transaction. An important part of the token is a one-time card number. Thus, in every transaction, both the user's device and the credit card company's payment server have a freshly generated one-time token in common. Because this token does not include any information about the original credit card and has a brief lifetime, it guarantees strong security [13] . Samsung Pay uses tokenization technology that is compatible with the EMV standard [13] . According to [12] , Samsung cooperates with Visa, MasterCard, and American Express in using the tokenization specification [13] . Another security feature is the hardware security platform. Samsung Pay maintains sensitive information in a secured zone called the trusted zone (TZ), which is controlled by a secure operating system called KNOX. KNOX assigns dedicated computational resources for security operations and does not permit access to conventional applications. The third security feature is authentication. Samsung Pay follows the FIDO specification [14] , which makes online fingerprint-based authentication possible. In addition, a conventional PIN can be used [14] . The one-time token is only generated after successful authentication.
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EAVESDROPPING SYSTEM
In this section, we explain the implementation of the proposed eavesdropping system. The eavesdropper consists of a hardware device, i.e., magnetic signal collector (MSC), designed to receive magnetic signals over long distances and transform the received signals into electronic signals. It also consists of a software module that decodes the electrical signals into payment information. The software module, working in a smartphone, comprises an audio signal processing module, a demodulator, and a decoder. A schematic of the eavesdropper is shown in Fig. 7 . Readers may need to recall the decoding process of electrical signals described in Section II-A. A description of each component is provided in the remainder of this section. In addition, we address the signal processing issues caused by remote eavesdropping. 
A. MAGNETIC SIGNAL COLLECTOR (MSC)
This device collects magnetic signals and converts them into electrical signals, as shown in Fig. 3 (C). The magnetic coil portion is expanded to enhance the successful reception rate of magnetic signals. We created a spiral coil by winding the wire such that the magnetic field signal could be captured at long distances. The coil is shown in Fig. 8-(A) . Specifically, a 24-AWG-thick coated wire was wound 135 times to form a coil with a radius of 40 cm. The end of this coil was connected to a microphone connector with a switch, as shown in Fig. 8-(B) . By connecting this terminal to a smartphone, the signal transmitted from Samsung Pay could be processed. 
B. SOFTWARE MODULES FOR DECODING SIGNALS
The components that process the received electrical signals are implemented as software that works in a smartphone. Each module is described in detail.
1) AUDIO SIGNAL PROCESSING MODULE
In this module, the signal value transmitted to the smartphone through the microphone input is converted using PCM (44100 Hz, 16 bits), and the conversion result is transmitted to the demodulator module. In addition, simple preprocessing is performed to eliminate the silence in the signal. The input electrical signals, which have a frequency of around 1600-3200 Hz, are equivalent to converted audible analog voice signals. Therefore, the input signal can be processed by a smartphone using voice signal processing software. We used the PyAudio library [16] for this purpose. The corresponding Python implementation code is presented in Fig. 27 and Fig. 28 in the Appendix. An example of the processing result is shown in Fig. 9 . The x-axis represents the frame number and the y-axis represents the amplitude of the signal.
2) DEMODULATOR
It converts the electric signal value from the previous module into bit values as an intermediate task for conversion into payment information. Compared to the same operation performed by a magstripe card reader, this task is more complicated in terms of extracting the bit value effectively because the eavesdropped signal contains noise in proportion to the eavesdropping distance. Before delving into the details of this module, we need to know how the bit values are encoded in the signal. Fig. 10 shows the process of encoding the bit values into a signal according to the ISO 7811-2 standard. 1 One bit value is expressed per fixed period in the signal. The transition of the signal value (positive peak → negative peak or vice versa) always occurs in the middle of each period. The method of expressing each bit value is as follows. If the transition of the signal value occurs between two consecutive periods, the next period represents bit 1; if no transition occurs, it represents bit 0. The bit-value extraction process is shown in Fig. 11 . As shown in Fig. 10 , the signal contains the bit string 10100. We explain how these bit values are extracted by the proposed module.
First, the positions of the negative peaks and positive peaks are extracted from the signal, and the interval between each consecutive pair of peaks is calculated. If the interval between peaks is short, bit 1 is considered to be encoded, which is the case for the peak intervals marked in yellow in Fig. 11 . If bit 1 is extracted, the next peak interval is ignored, which is shown as the case of gray arrows in Fig. 11 . If the interval between peaks is medium or long, a bit value of 0 is encoded, which is the case of peak intervals shown in blue or green in the figure. In this case, the next peak interval is not skipped.
The implementation of a specific demodulation module on the basis of this concept is as follows.
1) Divide the transmitted signal into chunks of a specific time interval of 1024 frames. 2) Read the chunks in chronological order.
3) Extract sequences of consecutive non-silent chunks that exist between two silent chunks. We say that a chunk is silent if the maximum amplitude in the chunk is less than 100. 4) In each non-silent sequence, find the local highest positive peak and the local lowest negative peak in every window of a given size W . 5) Align the detected positive and negative peaks in the sampled time sequence. 6) If the interval between each pair of peaks is less than W , the interval is converted into 1; otherwise, it is converted into 0. 7) Repeat Steps 4)∼6) for various values of W (W ∈ {7, 8}).
3) DECODING INTO PAYMENT INFORMATION
The decoder module performs the same operation as that performed by the magstripe card reader, as described in Section II-A.2. The demodulated bits are converted into character values according to the rules presented in Fig. 4 . This verifies that the converted characters have the form shown in Fig. 5 and finally verifies that the LRC is calculated correctly. If the verification is complete, the corresponding bit values are the correct ones. The payment information obtained in this step can be transmitted to any connected device through the Internet, as we can encode them as bit strings using ASCII code or UNICODE easily in a smartphone.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed eavesdropping system, we measured the eavesdropping success rates at various distances and angles between the MSC and the victim's smartphone (MST device). Fig. 12 shows the five experimental settings. Note that there are two options in the 90 • setting. The success rate is defined as (the number of successful attempts of collecting and reconstructing the one-time token used)/(the total number of token emissions by an MST device).
FIGURE 12.
Experimental setting (the solid violet line represents the front of the phone).
In this experiment, we ran a Samsung Pay transaction on a smartphone. The smartphone generated magnetic signals using the magnetic loop in the plane of the phone. The MSC was in one of the settings indicated in Fig. 12 . Using MST, the smartphone emitted a magnetic signal 20 times for a single transaction; we measured the number of times the proposed eavesdropping system could successfully eavesdrop on the magnetic signal.
If the LRC of the collected and decoded one-time token was correct, eavesdropping was considered successful. We conducted this experiment three times per experimental setting at various distances. From a total of 60 magnetic pulse transmissions, we counted the number of successful collected and decoded one-time tokens in each setting. We measured the success rates at distances of 0.3 m to 2.4 m. Fig. 13 shows the results of this experiment. Except in the 90 • cases, eavesdropping was successful with a probability of greater than 50% at 1.5m from the victim's device. In the ''Front'' and ''Back'' cases, the attacker was successful with a probability of greater than 40% despite being 1.8 m away from the victim's device. We emphasize that a low success rate does not mean that it is difficult to succeed with this attack; only one success in sniffing the one-time token of the 20 total transmitted signals per transaction is sufficient for the proposed attack to succeed. Table 1 summarizes the maximum distance at which sniffing succeeded with at least 40% probability in each experimental setting. Furthermore, 
V. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED EAVESDROPPER: WORMHOLE PAYMENT ATTACK AGAINST SAMSUNG PAY
To show that eavesdropping of MST magnetic signals is a real security threat, we performed an attack on the Samsung Pay protocol using the proposed eavesdropping system. As shown in Fig. 14, our eavesdropping system is capable of acquiring a one-time token from a smartphone that uses Samsung Pay when it emits magnetic signals using MST for payment. We show that the acquired one-time token can be used to launch a wormhole attack [17] , as shown in Fig. 15 . The wormhole attack is performed as follows. The attacker who obtains the one-time payment information of the victim using the proposed eavesdropping device sends the information over a long distance, e.g., via the Internet, to his/her assistant or helper, who can use the information to make a payment for a purchase.
To implement this attack, we employed a remote malicious payment device (RMPD) that includes an MST device. Specifically, it consists of an MST device and a software module that receives one-time payment information from other smartphones through the Internet, converts the received information into an audio-type signal using the PyAudio library, and transmits the corresponding signal through the audio jack of the smartphone to the MST device. The MST device emits a magnetic signal. The software module performs exactly the reverse order of eavesdropping. The MST device consists of a coil having a relatively small diameter, wound several tens of times, and an amplifier that is connected to make the magnetic signal sufficiently strong. Fig. 16 shows the RMPD. The source code of the software module in the RMPD is shown in Fig. 29 and Fig. 30 . We executed an experimental payment to show the feasibility of this attack in a real-world environment. In this experiment, an eavesdropper with the proposed eavesdropping system in her shoulder bag sniffed a victim's one-time token at a restaurant and then sent the sniffed one-time token to her collaborator, who had an RMPD in a different location.
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The MSC was concealed in a pizza box sufficiently large to accommodate a pizza having a radius of 45.72 cm. The bottom part of Fig. 17 shows photos capturing the moment when the attack was executed. In Fig. 17-(A) , the locations of the eavesdropper and RMPD are indicated on a map. In the experiment, the wormhole attack was successful; the collaborator bought some cookies using the victim's payment information. This implies that there is no validation procedure for consistency between the position of the one-time token issuance and that of the payment with the token taking place in the Samsung Pay system. In this experiment, after the one-time token signal was emitted, the victim and the checkout staff spent a few seconds discussing the price and payment options before the staff pressed the enter key in the POS device to send the price information and one-time token to the credit card company server. During this conversation, the attack collaborator completed his payment using the eavesdropped one-time token before the victim's payment transaction was sent to the credit card company server.
If the attackers use their own POS device, they can complete a payment as soon as they receive a sniffed one-time token from the eavesdropper, which requires less time and increases the probability of success of the attack.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section, we address various issues related to improving the performance of the attack using the proposed eavesdropper. First, we consider the payment race between the attacker and the victim, and we discuss an attack method that can overcome this issue. Second, we discuss the possibility of the victim detecting the attack after its success and determine if this effectively mitigates the impact of the attack. Finally, we discuss an approach for extending the eavesdropping range.
A. DEALING WITH THE RACE CONDITION IN THE ATTACK
In the case of a basic attack as proposed in this study, the victim's one-time Samsung Pay token information is captured and payment is attempted physically from a distance. However, if the victim succeeds in completing the Samsung Pay transaction during the tapping and reuse of this information, the information becomes useless to the attacker. Therefore, for the attacker to succeed, the victim must not complete the payment transaction prior to the completion of the attack. This condition is known as the race condition.
This section discusses an improved attack that introduces a jammer to help overcome the race condition. In this attack, a jamming device located behind the POS device generates a jamming signal in the direction of the victim, who is making the payment in front of the POS device.
In this case, if the attacker is located behind the victim and is farther from the jamming device than the victim, then not only can the victim's one-time token be eavesdropped but also the victim cannot succeed in making the payment. Fig. 18 shows an improved attack scenario using jamming to overcome the race condition. The proposed jammer is implemented similarly to the RMPD, but it uses stronger amplification and differs from the RMPD in that it generates garbage information at a much higher frequency. However, the signal is configured in the standard ISO7811-2 format so that the POS device can recognize the corresponding garbage one-time token. Hence, the POS device associated with the victim's payment cannot receive the correct one-time token information, and the attacker can always make the payment successfully. We implemented a jammer with a 500 W amplifier and a coil having a diameter of 1 m at a total cost of around US$250. Fig. 19 shows the architecture and implementation of the jammer. Fig. 20 shows the results of the jamming experiment. In the experiment, the jammer was positioned 1.5 m from the target POS device, and it succeeded in making the POS device recognize a garbage one-time token while the victim's Samsung Pay device and the POS device were running the Samsung Pay protocol (Fig. 20(A) ). As shown in the figure, the victim's one-time token information was changed to garbage (0000-0000-0000-0000) owing to interference by the jammer (Fig. 20(B) ). As this situation is repeated until the termination of the Samsung Pay protocol, the victim's payment process fails.
There are various ways to alleviate the effects of jamming attacks. First, with adaptive filtering, it is possible to measure the jammer signal arriving at the eavesdropping coil and then subtract it from the received signal [18] . Second, as described in [19] , early detection of the occurrence of jamming attacks is possible by analyzing the characteristics of normal signals. In this case, the Samsung Pay device can inform the user of the occurrence of a jamming attack in advance so that the user can respond to it. Finally, it is possible to shape or position the eavesdropped antenna such that it is least likely to pick up the jammer signal by adopting the method described [20] or by orienting it parallel to the field lines of the jammer once the jammer is located.
B. POSSIBILITY OF ATTACK DETECTION BY THE VICTIM OR THE SERVICE PROVIDER
We discuss whether a victim using Samsung Pay can immediately recognize and respond to a successful attack. Once the attack is successful, the victim's attempted payment fails. Because the attacker's payment is successful, a message indicating that the payment was successful is temporarily displayed at the top of the victim's smartphone screen and disappears after one to two seconds. The message includes the name of the place where the attacker made the payment and the transaction amount. The victim can recognize that something is wrong by reading the message carefully. However, victims who do not know about the existence of the proposed attack are less likely to notice an attack or realize that their Samsung Pay token information has been eavesdropped. Moreover, as the message is received after a delay of a few seconds following the payment, the victim may not notice it.
Even if the attack is noticed, the victim cannot resolve it alone; he/she requires the assistance of the credit card company to cancel the attacker's transaction. For the victim to cancel the payment, it would be necessary to visit the location where the attack occurred and return the purchased goods or services. Therefore, all the victim can do is call the credit card company associated with the Samsung Pay transaction, notify them that an anomaly has occurred, and seek a solution.
Although it is not currently implemented, if the location of the token to be used with the payment device is included in the token and is compared with the location of the user's Samsung Pay device, malicious payment can be detected. However, for this purpose, Samsung Pay itself must provide location information, and the transaction should fail in the case of a location mismatch. Moreover, the cost of managing the location information of all POS devices in the payment system is expected to be high.
C. INCREASING THE EAVESDROPPING RANGE
In this subsection, we discuss a method for increasing the eavesdropping distance to improve the effectiveness of this attack. By analysis and further engineering of the Samsung Pay signal, we succeeded in eavesdropping on the token signal at a distance of 2.7 m from the victim's device in the ''Front'' setting (refer to Fig. 12 ) with high probability.
1) EXTRACTING THE TOKEN FROM THE ENTIRE SIGNAL
The main result of our work is based on the existence of silence to determine where the part of the signal containing meaningful data begins. However, this approach cannot be adopted if the eavesdropper is at a large distance from the victim's device, as the amount of noise in the transmitted signal increases. Hence, we adopted the following approach to extract the Samsung Pay token even if the eavesdropper is more than 2.4 m from the victim's device.
1) The Samsung Pay protocol emits the token data 20 times, and before sending the actual token data, it emits 30 ''0'' bits followed by the start sentinel 11010. Let us call these data the preamble. 2) We collected a clear version of the preamble 30 cm away from the victim's device using the MSC. As the preamble is independent of the actual token data, attackers can collect it easily. Fig. 22 2 shows the reference signal of the preamble that we collected. 3) Using the collected reference signal, we performed a real attack with the eavesdropped signal. For ease of description, suppose that the reference signal is P and the signal we are eavesdropping is V. 4) We calculated the cross-correlation between P and V. Fig. 23 shows V and the cross-correlation result between P and V in (A) and (B), respectively. 5) On the basis of the cross-correlation result, we extracted a signal that contains the actual token data from the entire signal. Because this chunk exists in the entire signal 20 times in a single execution of the Samsung Pay protocol, attackers can extract these signal chunks up to 20 times. 6) We applied a matched filter to each of collected signals with clean templates of the bit value ''1'' in Fig. 21 . The clean templates were extracted from the signal in Fig. 22 through deconvolution. Both (a) and (b) in Fig. 21 were applied to maximize the effect of the matched filter.
2) EXTRACTING THE TOKEN NUMBER
Then, the extracted signals that contain the token information are averaged. Subsequently, the peaks of the averaged signal 2 Note that the x-axis represents the frame numbers and the y-axis represents the amplitude of the signal in all the graphs displaying the signals, i.e., those in Fig. 20∼23 . The signals are plotted after PCM (44100 Hz, 16 bits), as shown in Fig. 8 . are recognized in the manner described in Section III-B.2. Finally, we extract the token number (i.e., the accurate information needed for payment).
We tested the possibility of eavesdropping over a distance of at least 1.8 m using the improved method. Specifically, we conducted 100 experiments per distance and analyzed the success rate of token number extraction according to the number of token signals considered for the average. The analysis results are shown in Fig. 24 . If this average includes sufficient token numbers, the token number interception success rate is greater than 80% up to 2.7 m. Note that 20 token data are emitted when the Samsung Pay protocol is executed once. Therefore, if the victim executes the Samsung Pay protocol once, the attacker can obtain a signal containing up to 20 token numbers. 
VII. RELATED WORK
This section reviews some related studies. The authors of [21] attempted to employ short-distance wireless communication technologies for mobile payment systems, such as Bluetooth, RFID, and near-field communication (NFC), and they compared and analyzed their communication ranges, costs, and frequency ranges as well as organizations that might consider employing these technologies. They highlighted the problems in each technology in terms of conflicts of interest, security and reliability, interoperability, and availability. However, magnetic signals were not considered as a means of communication for a mobile payment system in their study. In [22] , the authors dealt with the security vulnerabilities of NFC-enabled smartphones and proposed corresponding attack methods. They also addressed the vulnerabilities in software that processes data in the NFC Data Exchange Format (NDEF). They demonstrated attacks leveraging these vulnerabilities, which include URI spoofing based on tag data and worms that can disperse through NFC. However, their study did not consider the vulnerabilities of mobile payment systems that use magnetic signals. A recent study on the security of such NFC-based payment systems has been described in [23] . It compared various payment services that provide contactless NFC-based mobile wallets and discussed various related attacks and vulnerabilities. This study is similar to our study in that it deals with the risk of eavesdropping and eavesdropping token reusability. However, it does not deal with the eavesdropping of MST-based magnetic signals and attacks on Samsung Pay.
In [24] and [25] , the authors focused on eavesdropping of RFID communications. In these studies, the attackers aimed to eavesdrop on information exchanged between an RFID and a reader at a longer distance. Specifically, these studies focused on eavesdropping of a standard 13.56 MHz RFID signal. In [26] , mobile payment systems were classified into five types: mobile payment as the POS, mobile payment at the POS, independent mobile systems, mobile payment platforms, and direct carrier billing. Then, some security methods for mobile payment systems were introduced, such as multifactor authentication, password and PIN based authentication, secure elements, and SSL/TLS. In addition, possible security risks against mobile payment systems were addressed, such as SSL/TLS vulnerabilities, malware, and data leakage. Furthermore, possible solutions for remediation were discussed. However, eavesdropping of mobile payment at the POS was not considered, which is related to the security of Samsung Pay.
A few recent studies have investigated the security of payment systems using magnetic signals, such as magstripe cards and MST. In [27] , the authors addressed the issues of security vulnerabilities of magnetic credit cards, such as malicious magstripe card readers and skimming devices. To resolve these issues, a device similar to a phone supporting Samsung Pay was proposed, i.e., a device that collects the credit card number from an electronic signal from the smartphone that is connected to the device and transmits it as a magnetic signal to a magstripe card reader. In addition, an approach for employing a one-time credit card number was proposed. The credit card issuer issues the one-time credit card number to a user's smartphone for each transaction, and the user makes payments with the received one-time number. The authors addressed the eavesdropping issue considered in the present paper, but only for the case in which the obtained card number is used multiple times by attackers after the current payment has been carried out. They did not address cases in which the eavesdropped card number is used for payment before the user completes the current transaction.
In [28] , the authors independently conducted a study parallel to ours. They described the vulnerabilities in the implementation of tokenization technology used in Samsung Pay. As with our study, one of the attack scenarios considered that the one-time token information used can be acquired and reused. However, in contrast to our study, which mainly focuses on the possibility of eavesdropping of MST signals, this study focused on the problems in implementing tokenization. It did not consider efficient ways to eavesdrop on MST signals. Furthermore, it did not include experimental analysis of the possibility of eavesdropping in various environments.
In [29] , the authors analyzed vulnerabilities and demonstrated attacks against Samsung Pay and Alipay, which are one-time token-based payment services using one-way communication channels. They addressed the case in which MST is used for payment in Samsung Pay and the case in which QR codes are used Alipay. In particular, in this study, as with our study, it was shown that the victim's token could be eavesdropped and the eavesdropped token could be used after interrupting the user's payment via jamming in the Samsung Pay protocol. This study referred to this attack as synchronized token lifting and spending (STLS).
This attack is very similar to ours in that eavesdropping of the token and jamming of the victim's legitimate use of the token are performed. However, the following issues exist. First, although this study claims to be the first study to propose STLS, Mendoza's study had suggested a similar attack method. We also proposed the attack method independently prior to [29] . In addition, our study differs from [29] in that a customized jammer is implemented in our study whereas a commercial jammer was used in [29] .
Moreover, in terms of the eavesdropping distance, only ''at least two meters'' was mentioned in [29] and no specific experimental results were presented. However, our study has presented the results of eavesdropping tests for various directions and distances from the MST device, and we have shown that eavesdropping is possible even 2.7 m away from the MST device. In addition, the eavesdropped signal processing method is different in that only a bandpass filter is used in [29] , whereas a matched filter and the cross-correlation technique are used to increase the eavesdropping distance in our study.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this study, we investigated the possibility of eavesdropping on magnetic signals generated by MST devices. We successfully developed an eavesdropping device that can work well up to 2.7 meters away from an MST device. Then, using the proposed eavesdropper, we showed that it is possible to perform a wormhole attack against Samsung Pay, which is a widely used MST-based mobile payment service, especially in Korea and the US. Further, we demonstrated that the eavesdropped signal can be used to remotely execute payment at a location different from that where the actual payment is being made by the victim. We hope that our results will benefit approximately 30 million Samsung Pay users worldwide [10] .
APPENDIX
A. DEMODULATOR AND DECODER IMPLEMENTATION
The source code presented in Fig. 25 and 26 specifies the details of the demodulation and decoding routines in the proposed eavesdropper. 
B. AUDIO SIGNAL PROCESSING MODULE
The source code presented in Fig. 27 and 28 specifies the details of the audio signal processing module.
C. ONE-TIME TOKEN ENCODING MODULE
The source code presented in Fig. 29 and 30 refers to the module that produces a sound signal containing the captured one-time token. The main routine of the module is the making_wav() function.
D. PARAMETERS OF THE SAMSUNG PAY PROTOCOL
This study deals with the vulnerability of the transmission process of the magnetic signal which contains the information of one-time payment token in Samsung Pay protocol. In this respect, the following parameters can be considered to adjust for the further work.
• Baseband frequency refers to the frequency range used for modulation of the signal when the Samsung pay device generates a magnetic signal containing one-time token information. If the frequency range is high, the one-time token information can be transmitted quickly. However, the probability of the successful demodulation of the corresponding signal by the receiver is lowered thus the reception rate of the signal is reduced. This applies equally to the eavesdropping attempts: if a lower frequency range is used for availability, the eavesdropping success rate also increases.
• The number of token signals generated per payment attempt means the number of times the Samsung Pay device emits the one-time token signal when performing a single payment operation. Since the POS device does not recognize 100% probability of the magnetic signal which is emitted from the Samsung Pay device, the Samsung Pay device should send the signal repeatedly for the successful payment. In the case of eavesdropping, the success rate is also expected to increase as the number of times it is increased. The observed number of repetitions was 20.
• The average interval between two consecutive signal emissions: if this value is too small, the receiver may fail to receive the current signal because it may arrive to the receiver while processing the previous signal. processing. However, if the interval is too large, it will take too long to wait for the next signal if decoding of the previous signal fails, resulting in an increase in the average time taken for payment.
• One-time token validity period is the time period for which a one-time token generated by a Samsung Pay device can be used for payment transactions. In order for the generated one-time token to be actually used, it must be delivered to the payment server of the credit card company. To this end, after the POS device received the MST signal of one-time token from the Samsung Pay device, it needs to transmit the decoded one-time token information via wired or wireless communication to the payment server of the credit card company with the help of relaying by the intermediate servers such as a VAN server. This process takes a certain amount of time, and a one-time token should be available for settlement over a period of at least this amount of time. If this timeout is exceeded, the card company will not approve payment using the onetime token. This factor is related to the effectiveness of the proposed attack. In the proposed attack, the eavesdropped one-time token is transmitted remotely from the actual victim's location. Then the malicious payment is made by the attacker. It takes some amount of time for transmission of the eavesdropped token. Therefore, an attack can be successful only if one-time token is valid for more than this required period of time for the attacker. This value is known to vary from country to country, such as 10 minutes in U.S and 1 minute in Korea. If the validity time is long, the likelihood of relay attack success increases. If it is short, the probability of attack success decreases. On the other hand, if it is too short, the honest users' normal payments may also fail with high probability. 
